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Nicolas Salazar Sutil 
 
Back in 350 BC, the philosopher Aristotle beavered away in his studies on 
animal life. His interest in animal biology was not negligible. After all, he 
devoted a total of five books to animal science, and also dedicated considerable 
space to the µanimal¶ category over the remainder of his corpus. It was not only 
within an empirical materialist study of natural history, but also in his studies on 
politics that the category of the µanimal¶ served Aristotle. It enabled him to define 
the µhuman¶ category through a fundamental schism. The µhuman¶, according to 
Aristotelian dialectics, is a category that is held together only in opposition to 
the µanimal¶, and through a function of negation of the other. But to the extent 
that Aristotle also equated µanimal¶ with µslave¶, and µslave¶ was categorized 
alongside µwoman¶ and µchild¶,[{note}]1 the category of the µanimal¶ was also a 
benchmark against which to discriminate µhuman¶ (that is, male and master) 
against its allegedly inferior other. It is not only the justification of a relationship 
of domination WKDWLVSUHSRVWHURXVEXWWKHIDFWWKDW$ULVWRWOH¶VWKLQNLQJ remained 
an authority on these matters for many centuries. You could argue that a large 
chunk of Western philosophy is grounded on this fundamental schism. 
 
Last Tuesday, as I sat idly on the sofa stroking my cat, and as Nacho purred 
away vigorously like an old Peugeot engine, I fished around for clues. Why is it 
that, despite efforts to the contrary, the Aristotelian schism has not been put to 
bed in recent neo-materialist thinking? If anything, the new materialist 
recognition of the agency or quasi-agency of the non-human (µanimals¶ are 
typically included in this broad category), has been doggedly haunted by 
schisms (variously blamed on Plato, Descartes, Hegel, empiricism, Darwinism 
and so forth). Categories like µpost-human¶, µnon-human¶, µinhuman¶, µmore-than-
human¶ or µother-than-human¶ continue to leech on to µhumanism¶ as a negative 
antecedent that needs to be exposed or overcome. It is necessary to develop 
conceptualizations that do not refer to the µhuman¶ at all, and that start from 
another basis, where schisms will no longer be rejected or queried, but quite 
simply, ducked. Nacho purred on, inure to my preoccupations. 
 
New materialists have given themselves a title to unmark their work from 
dialectical materialism in the Marxist sense, which concerns a social schism. 
However, although the new materialist wave has been most effective in opening 
up ethical debate concerning other-than-human beings (things, objects, 
animals, technologies and so forth) neo-materialists have offered no substitute 
WR0DU[¶VSUDFWLFR-critical approach. No consolidated implementation of a non-
human ethics has been put forward at the level of praxis. µTurning Animal¶ is a 
major contribution to new materialist thinking across performance and 
embodied arts practice, particularly through the worming away of a practico-
critical ethos. While new materialism has been most effective in giving the non-
human a priority, the non-human turn has also provoked an armchair ethical 
philosophy that refuses to burst its theoretical bubble. The chief defect of 
existing materialism, according to Marx, is that µsensuousness is conceived only 
in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous activity and 
practice¶ (1972: 121). New materialism has advanced a conceptual agenda that 
is hugely significant at the ethical level. One step forward, however, is also a 
step back. 
 
The purring gave me the idea for what is, arguably, the core contribution of this 
issue. It has become necessary to consider practico-critical efforts that seek to 
develop a seamless µearthling¶ ontology, which tries to supersede the negative 
(anti-humanist) critique. As a substitute for µschism¶ I propose µjism¶, a word that 
denotes sensuous forms of material knowledge, which are implemented not at 
the level of political action, but at the level of life praxis, arts praxis or life-as-art 
praxis. It is important to add that no word or method can fully describe the force 
that tethers different species in sensuous co-existence. Theoretical discourse is 
trapped within representation, which is why sensuous praxis is absolutely 
necessary as a direct means to grasp matter. As Jane Bennett puts it: µWhat 
method could possibly be appropriate for the task of speaking a word for vibrant 
matter? How to describe without thereby erasing the independence of things? 
How to acknowledge the obscure but ubiquitous intensity «?¶ (2010: xiii) New 
materialism has been most effective in raising concerns about the shortcomings 
of language and discourse (for example, words, terms and concepts), 
particularly when it comes to accessing matter, and the substance or force that 
animates matter. Going back to Nacho, physical touch is where both of us, cat 
and sapiens, turn on a wordless sensuality we share.  
 
Allusions to an erotic materialism are timely, not least because there are µreal¶ 
(that is, material) physical forces that can tether bodies to a larger flesh, akin to 
what David Abram calls the µerotic creativity of matter¶ (2010: 10). Jism is 
sensual and sexual potency²a magnetism that brings bodies together and 
connects corpo-realities across age, ability, gender, sex, and even species. 
Jism is a knowledge of animated life that comes not from the hedonistic act of 
fucking, but from our inescapable sexuation as living animals²that is, from a 
creaturely co-existence possessed with shared anima (spirit, soul, energy, chi, 
affect, call it what you will). Tim Ingold calls it µanimacy¶ (2011: 68), a vital force 
that compels life to physical movement and stillness, action and rest. Animacy 
is what animates and animalizes the living²giving the animal, plant or mineral 
an impulse to become (with) other. Deleuze calls it quite simply µa life¶: µpure 
immanence¶ (2001). With every attempt at naming, discourse picks up on a 
particular aspect of that complex affective substance within matter. Jism 
focuses on the sensuality, sexuality and desire behind the coming together of 
matter, as well as the emergence found in moments of mixing and merging²
what I call, based on Karen Barad¶Vnotion of intra-action, the µintra-course¶. 
Jism is pure mixing of substances: a mixing of blood, spit, vaginal secretion and 
semen.  
 
The term is laden with vernacular lore. But µjism¶ is not simply an old American 
slang word for µsemen¶, apparently used in offensive contexts. The etymology 
pries open excavations into all sorts of places, for instance, the world of jazz 
performance. Jazz music originated, according to a number of music historians, 
in the world of late nineteenth-century Southern hornblowers who played 
brothels and live sex houses (see Zelade 2015 or Cooke and Horn 2003). To 
have music played and to perform sex may have been deemed coterminous in 
this cultural context, hence the possible derivation of jazz from µjism¶, meaning 
spirit or energy in the form of spunk. Like the term µjazz¶ (formerly µjasm¶, 
apparently), jism holds a now-obsolete connotation meaning µvigor, speed, 
animation, and excitement¶ (Wentworth and Flexner 1960: 292). Jism is a 
corporeal atmosphere that exudes from µintra-course¶. Emergence occurs, 
according to Barad (2007), not because of an intersubjectivity, that is, not as a 
result of one living subject that acts upon another (one human acting upon 
another, or one machine acting upon another). Intra-action is the gap that lies 
in-between subjectivity, which leads to emergence. Similarly, intra-course is the 
effervescence emerging between two co-animated bodies sleeping, love-
making, jazzing or even eating each other (see Deller, this issue). Jism is 
expressed in entangled movements and animated noises of encounter. It is also 
found in animated matter that remains powerfully still and silent in order to fade 
into living surroundings (see Gibson, this issue). Jism is not found in the 
differentiation and individuation of physical entities. As a space of in-
betweenness that is µsmooth¶, in the Deleuzoguattarian parlance, jism only 
accepts continuity, for instance from human to bison, from bison to rock, from 
rock to phallus, from phallus to sound, from sound to vibrant silence. Jism is 
where semen and spirit meet.  
 
This is not a question of associating the µanimal¶ category with the beast inside 
or letting the dog, the foxy lady or the bitch out. Libido does not make me less 
µhuman¶ and more µanimal¶, in the Aristotelian sense. There is no animal inside 
the human. The animal is inside and outside. %\³Dnimal´,PHDQ the ontological 
condition RIEHLQJDQLPDRU³VXEVWDQFH´. In the vital materialist sense, 
³DQLPDOLW\´can be synonymous with immanence or ³a life´, in Deleuzian terms 
(2001). The ³human´ category, by contrast, exists only as a transcendental 
being that has broken out of that plane of pure immanence in some religiously 
upheld Aristotelian schism. As someone who is averse to such schisms, I 
consider myself to be µhumanimal¶ (see Kawa, this issue). Turning the animal on 
does not mean to get horny or blow horn. It is a consciousness of the activity 
and responsiveness that emerges between one body and another (like 
6SLQR]D¶V ³affect´), or between one species and another, which can be 
acquiescent or violent, creative or destructive. When experienced beyond a 
purely self-gratifying act, that is, beyond what Freud famously called the 
µpleasure principle¶ (2003), sexual and sensual forces bulldozer differentiation. 
Jism triggers an excess at the bodily level spilling beyond the confinement of 
the ego. Turning the animal on does not refer to the pornography of explicit sex 
objects, which a pleasure-seeking subject consumes without substance. What 
is at stake here is not sensuality and sex for voyeuristic and onanistic delight, 
but a practice that can induce loss of subjectivity and objectivity in the affective 
coming-together with the body of another. Like /DFDQ¶Videa of jouissance, jism 
even exceeds a phenomenological sense of bodily self, or lived-in µI¶. Jism sees 
no distinction between subject and object; it is an independent substance that 
connects all animals, all sexuated plants, all attractive and repulsive mineral 
and chemical copulators, within a shared animic ontology. Jism is why Nacho 
and I spend hours in physically tethered intra-course. It is the sensuality and 
vigour of co-bodily contact that brings us two animals together. 
 
Differentiation through sexuation does not justify genital, gender and species 
division, a la Aristotle. In other words, although sexuation implies anatomical 
difference, this does not presuppose a system of domination or normativization 
(heterosexual or anthroposexual). There is no such thing as de-humanization 
due to consented sex, as though humans existed in some kind of moral 
pedestal above so-called non-human animals. The question of gender is only 
meaningful if you define yourself in terms of a categorically fixed subjectivity, 
without accepting the slippery possibilities of becoming (with) other (see Deller, 
this issue). There is no word that can describe the atmosphere and common 
corporeality that appears when two or more bodies are entangled in the act of 
sexual intra-course. There is no word for the common body that appears when 
a human strokes a cat and the two are caught up in jismic affect. Whether sex is 
homo or hetero or zoophiliac does not make a difference to jismic affect. On the 
contrary, jism liberates sexuality from genital sex, from gender or from species 
specificity. What jism recognizes is the force that animalizes all sexuated 
beings, all beings liable to love and hate, attraction and repulsion, neikon and 
phylia. As Deleuze and Guattari have pointed out,  
 
the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into 
play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the 
relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2015: 213)  
 
Jism is the tethering of material differentiation and individuation into identities 
knotted together. A well-known example of this would be µBrangelina¶ (now 
broken up into the divorced identities of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie). Not long 
ago, a husband-and-wife identity saw these two people in one, at least in the 
eyes of the media. Jism establishes identitary µsyzygies¶, to borrow the term 
from Alfred Jarry,[{note}]3 in the form of man±woman, husband±wife, 
boyfriend±girlfriend, boyfriend±boyfriend, husband±husband, wife±wife, 
girlfriend±girlfriend, human±pet, woman±dog, man±cat, bull±man and so on. A 
thousand tiny sexes, all driven by a conative force that tethers opposites. Jism 
makes all living beings prey to a desiring matter. µThere are only inhumanities,¶ 
added Deleuze and Guattari,  
 
humans are made exclusively of inhumanities, but very different ones, of 
very different natures and speeds. Primitive inhumanity, prefacial 
inhumanity, has all the polyvocality of a semiotic in which the head is a 
part of the body, a body that is already deterritorialized relatively and 
plugged into becomings²spiritual/animal. (Deleuze and Guattari 2015: 
190)  
 
One critical point made by Deleuze and Guattari, which various contributors to 
this issue and I myself ape in our work, is that there is no position of fixed 
phenomenological humanity from where to start. There is no phenomenological 
µ,¶IURPZKHUHWRODXQFKDVXEMHFWLYLW\EXWRQO\DSURFHVVRIµreal¶ material 
change or becoming other. 
 
Becoming animal is then the key conceptual problem bugging many of the 
authors who have contributed to this issue (see Kubiak, Grum, and Bianco). In a 
Deleuzoguattarian sense, µbecoming¶ is a force driven towards otherness. What 
this impulsion leaves in its wake is a µreality¶, which is always material. I call it 
µmatter-reality¶ or µcorpo-reality¶. Because the body is inhuman or earthling at the 
material stratum, it is driven towards its otherness either through wild evolution, 
or through technological means of becoming (that is, through becoming cyborg, 
becoming avatar, becoming alien, becoming hybrid, becoming chimera, and so 
on). There is an ontological difference, however, between vital and artificial life. 
If I stroke my car, my television set or my iPhone, there will be no response 
other than through gesture-recognition or some other paradigm of control. Every 
one of these technologized µhumanimal¶ becomings forge a different material 
µreality¶, which raises questions about the tension between vital and artificial life 
(see Stoijnic, Bianco, and Spiess and Strecker, this issue).  
 
In addition to becoming animal, which is a strictly ontological and ultimately 
philosophical question, what we are working towards in this issue is the 
advancement of practical implementations of vital materialism through 
performances and body practices. The question is, what µreality¶ is being 
materialized in these practico-critical implementations? Performance emerges 
as a sensuous opportunity for various modes of µturning into¶ and µturning on¶, 
across a range of different stagings, some representational and some non-
representational, some theatrical and some not. Personally, I am suspicious of 
the theatricalization of the animal, for instance as seen in animal guising, animal 
theatre, musical theatre, and animal performance more generally. This is a 
critical question we could not have ignored in this issue. Various authors query 
animal mimesis in the merely representational sense, across a range of case 
studies in performance art and the performing arts (see Parker-Starbuck and 
Orozco, Kirkkopelto, Katsouraki, Seitz, and Nachbar, this issue). As a non-
representationalist, I prefer to turn tKHDQLPDORQ,IHHO1DFKR¶V pleasure, and 
his pleasure is also mine. The animacy, the power to animate and give lively 
motion to eroticized matter, is co-native (it is borne out of the intra-course found 
in-between our animal bodies). It is neither µhis¶ nor µmine¶ in the same way that 
µa life¶, in Deleuze¶V final essay (2001), written shortly before committing 
suicide), is neither µyours¶ nor µmine¶QRUµKLV¶. It is in itself.  
 
* * *  
 
Back in 1909, French paleontologist Charles Depéret wrote:  
 
at the very moment when the species has reached the maximum of 
power, either by the dimensions of the body or by the perfection of 
offensive or defensive weapons which would seem to afford protection 
against all enemies, the species is on the eve of vanishing. (Depéret 
1909: 236±7).  
 
According to a report into mass extinction published by the World Wildlife 
Foundation (WWF) in October 2016,[{note}]4 the number of wild animals living 
on planet Earth is set to fall by nearly two-thirds by 2020²or 67 per cent to be 
precise. Faced with the brute facts, it seems proper to ask: if the age of the 
Anthropocene can be defined by µhuman¶ control over every aspect of the 
environmentLV'HSpUHW¶VLGHDWKDWWKLVSLQQDFOHLVLQIDFWDOVRWKHYHUJHRIDQ
extinction a mere fatalism? A human species that stands alone, without wild 
animals in the immediate surrounding, is perhaps impoverished by intra-species 
relationships confined to humanized pets or µpettified¶ humans VHH:áRGDUF]\N, 
and Mezur, this issue). Where does the journey of becoming other lie, if there is 
no wild sense of otherness left? In pure technological singularity?  
 
Jism is not only a force of attraction, but also a force of repulsion. As I intimated 
earlier, µa life¶ is ontologically different to techno-living and industrial-living, to 
the extent that it is synonymous with a more-than-individual process involving 
decay, death, and decomposition of the individual body. By contrast, 
technologically redesigned living is grounded on the idea of transcendentalism, 
the ultimate victory over death. Transcendence is the opposite of immanence, 
JRLQJEDFNWR'HOHX]H¶VRQWRORJ\µTurning animal¶ and µturning the animal on¶ 
are not triggers for extended living. µTurning animal¶ will also imply ramming into 
death. Vitality will become extinguished in my body, if not extinct in my species. 
And yet, µa life¶ will snake its way to become some other material reality. Turning 
animal is the letting go of individual life for the perpetuation of generative 
matter, a turning of the dead human into humus (that is, organic soil).  
 
Jismic death is also the recognition of a final ecstasy, a fatal orgasm. The drive 
for life through death brings me back to the principles of µEros and Thanatos¶, 
as proposed by Sigmund Freud in his famous essay µBeyond the pleasure 
principle¶, which I briefly acknowledged earlier. Freud famously acknowledged 
that it is not enough to look at pleasure and unpleasure in isolation, or sex 
impulses versus repression. Beyond the simple dichotomy of sex/repression, 
pleasure/unpleasure, immediate satisfaction/reality, lies the more fundamental 
tension between life and death. The same applies to jism. Jism is not confined 
to sexual impulses, but to self-conservation through warmth, protection, feeding, 
and other self-preservative instincts. The key point in Freud¶s analysis is that a 
life drive is not the dialectical opposite of death, which would invoke a schism, 
but an ultimate aim. Freud defined instincts as ³conservative´, inasmuch as 
instinctive drives are characterized by a tendency to return the individual back 
to an old state or ³initial state from which the living entity has at one time or 
other departed, and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths along 
which its development leads.´Freud adds³In the last resort what has left its 
mark on the development of organisms must be the history of the earth we live 
in«If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living 
dies for internal reasons and becomes inorganic once again, then we shall be 
compelled to say that the aim of all life is death and, looking backwards, that 
inanimate things existed before living ones´ (1961: 32). 
 
The LPSOLFDWLRQRI)UHXG¶VDQDO\VLV is an ontological tension between a life of 
immanence and a life of transcendence, which dupes the ego to seek after-life 
and heavenly existence above animal life and death. Beyond the 
transcendentalist idea that human beings can defeat death through 
transcendental means, is the affirmation of pure animal and earthly immanence. 
A life whose aim is death is also a life which humiliates and humidifies the 
humananimal, a life of becoming humus (organic soil). This consciousness finds 
practical implementations in naturecultural systems that do not seek 
technological and techno-religious singularity but which, conscious of that 
cyclical history of earth we live in, affirms the animal death, like a hunter¶s 
consciousness of the need to kill or be killed for life (see O¶Connor, Drum and 
Metuq, this issue).  
 
The transcendentalist idea that non-animal humanity will be µsaved¶ by bio-
technology and biomedical engineering must be critically probed here. It is only 
³OLYLQJ´WKDW can be extended, not µa life¶. The two poles are in tension, since 
technologized living gives priority to an individual who defers and circumvents 
death, and a species that does not want to become extinct. With a life instinct 
projected unto transcendental ideologies and techno-religion, the alienated 
human fails to recognize that it is only through death that µa life¶, a humanimal 
existence, is affirmed and returned (with the animal other) to the same inorganic 
base. Techno-living is not merely a Tanathos principle²a drive for death, but a 
drive for annihilation .The idea that the human species is not under threat, and 
that it is only the non-human animal who will be vanishing from the planet, 
clouds this annihilation principle in a quasi-theological fantasy of human 
deliverance through technology (see Spiess and Strecker, this issue). The safer 
future for our own species is not to be predicated on the idea that human life 
has priority over all other life forms, and that biotechnology and biomedicine will 
continue to improve and extend human living to the point of defeating extinction. 
Going back to Depéret, this human-only future reveals a species at the pinnacle 
of its power, just at the verge of its hubristic demise.  
 
* * *  
 
Back in January in 2015, I spent a day²my birthday²in an animal park outside 
the picturesque village of Santillana del Mar, in Northeast Spain. There were no 
other visitors in Parque Cuaternario that day, as there were serious flood 
warnings all over Cantabria due to recent heavy downpours. That morning the 
rain had stopped, and so I managed to spend a day in this small animal park on 
my own. Parque Cuaternario had opened, I would like to think, just for me: a 
grown-up child horsing around in the zoo. 
 
The idea behind Parque Cuaternario is to show local visitors the animals that 
would have roamed the Northeastern Spanish hillsides during the last Ice Age 
and at the time of Altamira, the famous United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) listed prehistoric cave, which is located 
only a few miles from the park. In sum, the park is dedicated to animals that 
would have roamed the hills of Cantabria twenty thousand years ago, but which 
in the European subcontinent are now extinct in the wild. Many of them, I found, 
did not seek eye-contact. This applied to the lynx, the wolf, the bear and the 
lion. The meat-eating hunters did not want me there, nor did they recognize my 
vain attempts at connecting. On the contrary, the meat-eaters seemed bugged 
and agitated, as they moved around in crabby stereotypies, forever caught in 
motionless movement. The bison, the wild horse and the reindeer did, however, 
react in all manner of jismic ways. The herbivores looked back, especially the 
bison. After hours of eye contact, the bison began to follow me around, and to 
seek me, pushing his big brown head in between the metal bars of his pen, 
asking perhaps for a caress, some food, a shared moment. I began to imagine 
myself like WKHFKDUDFWHULQ-XOLR&RUWi]DU¶VVKRUWstory µAxolotl¶ (1998: 161-5). 
After spending days watching salamanders in a Parisian aquarium, the man in 
&RUWi]DU¶VVWRU\ILQDOO\WXUQVLQWRRQH:RXOG,HYHr?  
 
Like the Bison-Man of Cave of El Castillo, a bull±man hybrid drawn into a 
stalagmite in the nearby prehistoric cave of Monte Castillo, could I ever µturn 
into¶ that bison, or could I ever turn him on? He most definitely turned me on. 
Take a look at the impressive body: the formidable legs, the strong hump, the 
matted beard, the muscular shoulders, the gentle black eyes. It is not surprising 
that every year the bachelors of Bielsa²a town located a hundred or so miles 
from El Castillo²dress up as bulls (or trangas) to badger, hump and dance with 
the bachelorettes of the town (dressed up in white dresses and coloured laces), 
thus performing an ancient seasonal ritual called µCarnabal del Valle de Bielsa¶ 
perhaps in recognition of a vitalizing animal jism. As I put it in my own 
autoethnographic study of this event, the Bielsa carnival forces the visitor to 
µmind the hump¶, that is, to have a mindful consciousness of a jism, an animated 
and excited affect, which is performed to suggest a spilling of jouissance even 
beyond the human species.[{note}]5  
 
I have been hounded by those deep eyes. It has struck me quite profoundly that 
the very same expression in the bison of Parque Cuaternario is found in a 
painting contained inside the cave of Altamira, which is circa 17,000 years old. 
The eye of one of the many bison figures painted in the Hall of the Polychromes 
in Altamira Cave is immediately evocative, from my first-hand 
observation,[{note}]7 of a jismic encounter that may have happened between 
hunter-gatherer and bull in the Upper Paleolithic era (see Kawa, and Kubiak, 
this issue).  
 
As Derrida would have it, there is something akin to a µtranscendental instinct¶ 
(2008: 34) at work here, except that it is not transcendental at all, but immanent. 
The impetus for vital life and for the connection of a jismic anima across species 
is µpure immanence¶ in the Deleuzian ontology (2001). Like death, vital life is a 
transhistorical imperative found both within and also outside, cutting across the 
bodies of two different species like water through a sponge. And yet, if instinct is 
another transhistorical imperative that determines how an animal behaves in the 
face of environmental change, and if indeed sapiens proved to have an 
instinctive capacity to survive in previous eras of climactic change (not least the 
Ice Age), then has this instinct been skewed in an age of global warming, where 
techno-humanity is prey to a Tanathos principle defined by the fantasy of 
transcendence? Instinct has succumbed to extinct life, and a humanistic idiocy 
that professes the killing of other species to secure the ever-lasting living of 
µhumans¶. When a consciousness of that cross-species anima is awakened, 
even two hunters (sapiens and cat) can agree to stand before each other, and 
DVWKH\ORRNLQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VH\HVand as the warmth wakes up, so they can 
decide to walk side by side, co-animated. 
Notes 
 
1 Aristotle conceived women as subject to men, but as higher than slaves. In Politics 
1.12 Aristotle wrote: µThe slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element; the female 
has it but it lacks authority; the child has it but it is incomplete¶ µPlants¶, Aristotle also 
wrote, µare created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men.¶ An 
DXWKRULW\LQWKHVHPDWWHUVXSXQWLOWKH0LGGOH$JHVDWWKHYHU\OHDVW$ULVWRWOH¶VLGHD
that humans are µmasters¶ of nature based on rational powers also had a lasting 
influence on Islamic thinking. 
2 Abram also speaks of the µeros between body and forests¶ (2010: 80). 
3 In astrology, syzygy is a complementarity of opposites, the two-in-one. Syzygy is 
also a notion that Jarry developed from occultist literature. In this context, µsyzygy¶ 
often refers to the double identity of the man-woman, or what Jarry also called the 
Caesar-Antichrist (1965: 66). 
4See: WWF. 2016. Living Planet Report 2016. Risk and resilience in a new era. 
WWF International, Gland, Switzerland The full report is available online: 
http://www.wwf.org.uk/sites/default/files/2016-
10/LPR_2016_full%20report_spread%20low%20res.pdf 
5 For a critical account of this Pyrenean carnival, see Salazar Sutil (2008). 
6 The expression is RQORDQIURP:LOOLDP*ROGLQJ¶VThe Inheritors (2011), a novel 
that depicts the fictional encounter of Sapiens and Neanderthal humans in 
prehistoric Europe. The story, told from the Neanderthalian perspective, evokes a 
number of notable expressions such as this. Golding considered this to be his finest 
work of fiction. 
7 The Cave of Altamira, located in the region of Cantabria in North-eastern Spain, is 
strictly closed to the general public, who are only allowed to enter a life-size replica 
known as the Neocueva. In the framework of the Research Program for Preventive 
Conservation and Accessibility led by the board of the Museo Nacional y Centro de 
Investigación de Altamira (the National Museum and Research Centre of Altamira), I 
was granted special access to the original cave in January 2015. 
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